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We demonstrate that the Byzantine Agreement (detectable broadcast) is also solvable in the
continuous-variable scenario with multipartite entangled Gaussian states and Gaussian operations
(homodyne detection). Within this scheme we find that Byzantine Agreement requires a minimum
amount of entanglement in the multipartite states used in order to achieve a solution. We discuss
realistic implementations of the protocol, which consider the possibility of having inefficient ho-
modyne detectors, not perfectly correlated outcomes, and noise in the preparation of the resource
states. The proposed protocol is proven to be robust and efficiently applicable under such non-ideal
conditions.
I. INTRODUCTION
An algorithm is commonly defined as a set of rules for
solving a problem in a finite number of steps. One of the
aims of quantum information is to provide new protocols
and algorithms which exploit quantum resources to find
a solution to problems which either lack a solution using
classical resources or the solution is extremely hard to
implement. The term “Byzantine Agreement” was orig-
inally coined by Lamport & Fischer [1] in the context of
computer science to analyze the problem of fault toler-
ance when a faulty processor is sending inconsistent infor-
mation to other processors. In a cryptographic context,
it refers to distributed protocols in which some of the par-
ticipants might have malicious intentions and could try
to sabotage the distributed protocol inducing the hon-
est parties to take contradictory actions between them.
This problem is often reformulated in terms of a Byzan-
tine army where there is a general commander who sends
the order of attacking or retreating to each one of his lieu-
tenants. Those can also communicate pairwise to reach
a common decision concerning attacking or retreating,
knowing that there might be traitors among them includ-
ing the general commander. A traitor could create fake
messages to achieve that different parts of the army at-
tack while others retreat, which would put the army at a
great disadvantage. The question hence is whether there
exists a protocol among all the officials involved that,
after its termination, satisfies the following conditions:
The commanding general sends an order to his N − 1
lieutenants such that: (i) all loyal lieutenant obey the
same order (ii) if the commanding general is loyal, then
every loyal lieutenant obeys the order he sends. It is as-
sumed that the parties cannot share any previous setup.
Lamport et al. [2] proved that if the participants only
shared pairwise secure classical channels, then Byzan-
tine Agreement or broadcast is only possible if and only
if t < n/3 where n is the number of players and t is the
number of traitors among them. In [3] Fitzi and cowork-
ers introduced a weaker nevertheless important version of
Byzantine Agreement known as detectable broadcast. De-
tectable broadcast is said to be achieved if the protocol
satisfies the following conditions: (i) if no player is cor-
rupted, then the protocol achieves broadcast and (ii) if
one or more players are corrupted, then either the pro-
tocol achieves Byzantine Agreement or all honest players
abort the protocol. Thus, in a detectable broadcast pro-
tocol, cheaters can force the protocol to abort, i.e. no
action is taken. In such cases all honest players agree on
aborting the protocol so that contradictory actions be-
tween the honest players are avoided. In the same paper
[3], Fitzi, Gisin and Maurer [3] devised a solution to the
detectable broadcast problem using multipartite entan-
glement as a quantum resource. Later on Fitzi et al. [4]
and Iblisdir and Gisin [5] showed that a Quantum Key
Distribution (QKD) protocol, which guarantees a private
sequences of classical data shared between pairs of par-
ties, suffices to solve detectable broadcast. This situation
is reminiscent of quantum cryptography, in which two
seemingly independent main schemes exist for QKD, the
prepare-and-measure Bennett and Brassart 1984 (BB84)
scheme [6] which does not use entangled states shared
between Alice and Bob, and the Ekert 1991 (Ekert91)
scheme [7] where indeed entanglement is explicitly dis-
tributed and the security is guaranteed by Bell’s theo-
rem. However, the two schemes have been shown to be
completely equivalent [8], and specifically entanglement
stands as a precondition for any secure key distribution
[9].
Detectable broadcast might be regarded in a similar
view as quantum key distribution and, arguably, the
same reasoning applies to the different protocols ad-
vanced for its solution, making explicit or implicit use
of multipartite entanglement. In this paper, we adopt
an approach of the Ekert91, guided by the physical mo-
tivation of studying the performance and the usefulness
of multipartite entangled states as operational resources
to achieve detectable broadcast. While protocols for
2this task exist for qutrits [3] and qubits [10, 11], in
this paper we investigate the possibility of solving de-
tectable broadcast with continuous-variable (CV) sys-
tems [12, 13], namely with Gaussian states and perform-
ing Gaussian operations only. The motivations for this
approach are manifold. On the practical side, the re-
cent progress in CV QKD [14] has shown that the use of
efficient homodyne detectors, compared to photon coun-
ters employed in BB84 schemes, enables the distribution
of secret keys at faster rates over increasingly long dis-
tances [15]. On the theoretical side, multipartite entan-
glement is a central concept whose understanding and
characterization (especially in high-dimensional and CV
systems), despite recent efforts, is far from being com-
plete. It is important, therefore, to approach this task
operationally, i.e. by connecting entanglement to the suc-
cess or to the performance of diverse quantum informa-
tion and communication tasks [16], while exploiting the
differences between discrete-variable and CV scenarios.
For Gaussian states of light fields, which are presently
the theoretical and experimental pillars of quantum in-
formation with CVs [12, 13, 17], an important result in
this respect is due to van Loock and Braunstein [18].
They introduced a scheme to produce fully symmetric
(permutation-invariant) n-mode Gaussian states exhibit-
ing genuine multipartite entanglement. Furthermore,
they devised a communication protocol, the “quantum
teleportation network,” for the distribution of quantum
states exploiting such resources, which has been experi-
mentally demonstrated for n = 3 [19]. The optimal fi-
delity characterizing the performance of such a protocol
yields an operational quantification of genuine multipar-
tite entanglement in symmetric Gaussian states. This
quantification is equivalent to the information-theoretic
“residual contangle” measure, a Gaussian entanglement
monotone, emerging from the monogamy of quantum
correlations [20, 21]. Other applications of multipartite
Gaussian entanglement have been advanced and demon-
strated, and the reader may find more details in [12, 13],
as well as in the two more recent complementary reviews
[17] (theoretical) and [22] (experimental). In this respect,
the usage of multipartite entangled Gaussian resources
for the Byzantine Agreement problem was, to the best of
our knowledge, not previously investigated.
Here we propose a protocol to solve detectable broad-
cast with symmetric multimode entangled Gaussian
states and homodyne detection. This provides an alter-
native interpretation of multipartite Gaussian entangle-
ment as a resource enabling this kind of secure communi-
cation. We concentrate on the case of three parties, and
remarkably find that not all three-mode symmetric en-
tangled Gaussian states are useful to achieve a solution:
To solve detectable broadcast there is a minimum thresh-
old in the multipartite entanglement. This is at variance
with the two-party QKD counterpart: In there, all two-
mode entangled Gaussian states are useful to obtain a
secure key using Gaussian operations [23]. We eventually
discuss how our protocol can be implemented in realis-
tic conditions, namely considering detectors with finite
efficiency and yielding not perfectly matched measure-
ment outcomes, and Gaussian resources which are not
ideally pure, but possibly (as it is in reality) affected by
a certain amount of thermal noise. We show that under
these premises the protocol is still efficiently applicable to
provide a robust solution to detectable broadcast over a
broad range of the involved parameters (noise, entangle-
ment, measurement outcomes, and uncertainties), paving
the way towards a possible experimental demonstration
in a quantum optical setting.
The paper is organized as follows. In Sec. II we out-
line the steps needed to solve detectable broadcast in the
discrete scenario following [3, 10]. In Sec. III, we first
review briefly the basic tools needed to describe multi-
partite Gaussian states and measurements. Building on
the ideas presented in Section II we construct a protocol
adapted to the continuous-variable case. In Sec. IV we
discuss security on the distribution of quantum states for
the protocol. Section V is devoted to analyze the effects
of malicious manipulations of the data by dishonest par-
ties and its detection by the honest ones. In Sec. VI
we focus on the efficiency of the proposed protocol and
we extend our results to a realistic practical scenario, re-
laxing the conditions for obtaining of correlated outputs
between the players and assuming noise in the prepara-
tion of the input states. Finally, in Sec. VII we present
our concluding remarks.
II. DETECTABLE BROADCAST PROTOCOL
The protocols to solve detectable broadcast using en-
tanglement as a resource are based on three differentiated
steps:
(i) Distribution of the quantum states,
(ii) Test of the distributed states,
(iii) Protocol by itself.
Step (iii) is fundamentally classical, since it uses the
outputs of the different measurements of the quantum
states to simulate a particular random generator (“prim-
itive”). Let us consider the simplest case, in which only
three parties are involved. They are traditionally de-
noted by S (the sender, i.e. commander general) and
the receivers R0 and R1, and at most, only one is a
traitor. In this case, the primitive generates for ev-
ery invocation a random permutation of the elements
{0, 1, 2} with uniform distribution, i.e. (tS , tR0 , tR1) ∈
{(0, 1, 2), (0, 2, 1), (1, 0, 2), (1, 2, 0), (2, 0, 1), (2, 1, 0)}. In
this primitive, no single player n can learn more about the
permutation than the value tn (n = {S,R0, R1}) which
she or he, receives i.e., each player ignores how the other
two values are assigned to the other players. Further-
more, nobody else (besides the parties) have access to
the sequences.
3Entanglement is used in the protocol to distribute clas-
sical private random variables with a specific correla-
tion between the players, in such a way that any ma-
licious manipulation of the data can be detected by all
honest parties allowing them to abort the protocol. In
the discrete variable case such a primitive can be im-
plemented with qutrits using e.g. Aharonov states |A〉 =
1√
6
(|0, 1, 2〉+|1, 2, 0〉+|2, 0, 1〉−|0, 2, 1〉−|1, 0, 2〉−|2, 1, 0〉).
This choice allows the distribution and test part to be se-
cure (for details see [3]). Whenever the three qutrits are
all measured in the same basis, all three results are dif-
ferent. Hence – after discarding all the states used for
the testing of the distributed states [step (ii)] – the play-
ers are left with a sequence of L outputs that reproduces
the desired primitive. We schematically represent this
primitive by the table below.
j 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 . . .
S 2 0 0 1 2 1 0 2 1 . . .
R0 1 1 2 0 1 0 1 0 2 . . .
R1 0 2 1 2 0 2 2 1 0 . . .
After accomplishing the distribution and test part of the
protocol [steps (i) and (ii)], the sender S will broadcast
a bit b ∈ {0, 1} (0 ∧=“attack”, 1 ∧=“retreat”) to the two
receivers using classical secure channels.
Following [3] the broadcast [step (iii)] proceeds as fol-
lows:
(iii-1): We denote by bi the bits received by Ri, i = 0, 1
(notice that if the sender is malicious, the broadcasts
bits bi could be different). Each receiver Ri demands to
S to send him the indices j for which S obtained the
result bi. Each player Ri receives a set of indices Ji.
(iii-2): Each Ri test consistency of his own data, i.e.
checks weather his output on the set of indices he
receives (Ji) are all of them different from bi. If so the
data is consistent and he settles his flag to ci = bi.
otherwise his flag is settled to ci =⊥.
(iii-3): R0 and R1 send their flags to each other. If
both flags agree, the protocol terminates with all honest
participants agreeing on b.
(iii-4): If ci =⊥, then player Ri knows that S is dishon-
est, the other player is honest and accepts his flag.
(iii-5): If both R0 and R1 claim to have consistent data
but c0 6= c1, player R1 demands from R0 to send him all
the indices k ∈ J0 for which R0 has the results 1−c0. R1
checks now that (i) all indices k from R0 are not in J1
and (ii) the output R1 obtains from indices k correspond
to the value 2. If this is the case, R1 concludes that R0 is
honest and changes his flag to c0. If not, R1 knows that
R0 is dishonest and he keeps his flag to c1. Detectable
broadcast is in this way achieved.
III. CONTINUOUS-VARIABLE PRIMITIVE
Before describing in detail how to achieve the prim-
itive presented in the above section in the CV set up,
let us briefly review the most basic ingredients needed
to describe Gaussian states [12, 17]. We consider here
quantum systems of n canonical degrees of freedom, often
called modes, associated to a Hilbert spaceH =  L2(ℜ2n).
The commutation relations fulfilled by the canonical co-
ordinates RˆT = (Xˆ1, Pˆ1, . . . , Xˆn, Pˆn) = (Rˆ1 . . . , Rˆ2n) are
represented in matrix form by the symplectic matrix J :
[Rˆa, Rˆb] = i(Jn)ab, with a, b = 1, . . . , 2n, and
Jn = ⊕ni=1J J ≡
(
0 1
−1 0
)
. (1)
Gaussian states are, by definition, completely described
by their first and second moments. Hence, rather than
describing them by their (infinite-dimensional) density
matrix ρˆ, one can use the Wigner function representation
Wρ (ζ) =
1
πn
√
det γ
exp
[−(ζ − d)Tγ−1(ζ − d)] (2)
which is a function of the first moments through the dis-
placement vector d (a 2n real vector), and of the second
moments through the covariance matrix γ (a 2n×2n sym-
metric real matrix). Here ζ ∈ R2n is a phase-space vec-
tor. The positivity condition of ρˆ implies that γ+iJn ≥ 0.
Following the discussion of the protocol [step (iii)]
for the discrete case, we choose to use as a resource a
pure, fully inseparable tripartite Gaussian state ρˆa, com-
pletely symmetric under the interchange of the modes
[18], whose covariance matrix γ(a) accepts the following
parametrization [24]:
γ(a) =


a 0 c 0 c 0
0 b 0 −c 0 −c
c 0 a 0 c 0
0 −c 0 b 0 −c
c 0 c 0 a 0
0 −c 0 −c 0 b


, (3)
with a ≥ 1 and
b =
1
4
(5a−
√
9a2 − 8), (4)
c =
1
4
(a−
√
9a2 − 8). (5)
The condition for full inseparability (truly multipartite
entanglement) across the 1× 1× 1 mode partition comes
from the nonpositivity of the partial transpose (NPT-
criteria) and reads [24]:
γ + iJA 6≥ 0
γ + iJB 6≥ 0
γ + iJC 6≥ 0
4with JA = J
T⊕J⊕J , JB = J⊕JT⊕J , JC = J⊕J⊕JT.
It follows that γ(a) is fully inseparable as soon as a > 1.
Quantitatively, the genuine tripartite entanglement of
the states of Eq. (3), as measured by the residual contan-
gle [21], is a monotonically increasing function of a and
diverges for a→∞.
So far γ(a) appears as the “equivalent” CV version
of the discrete Aharonov state |A〉, i.e. fully insepa-
rable and completely symmetric under exchange of the
three players. One is tempted to infer, therefore, that the
discussed primitive of the discrete case can be straight-
forwardly generalized to the continuous one. A stan-
dard way of transforming the correlations of the shared
entangled quantum states ρˆa into a sequence of classi-
cally correlated data between the 3 players is to per-
form a homodyne measurement of the quadratures of
each mode. Denoting by XˆS , XˆR0 , XˆR1 the position
(or momentum) operator of each mode, and by xS , xR0 ,
xR1 the output of the respective measurement, the play-
ers can communicate classically with each other and
agree, for instance, only on those values for which either
|xS | = |xR0 | = |xR1 | = {0, x0} with x0 > 0. In this way
each player can associate the logical trit (t = 0, 1, 2) to a
null, positive, or negative result, respectively. The prob-
ability distribution that measuring the quadratures XˆS ,
XˆR0 , XˆR1 produces an outcome tS = j, tR0 = k, tR1 = l,
with (j, k, l) ∈ {0, 1, 2} and uncertainty σ is given by:
P(j, k, l) = Tr
(
ρˆ
{j,k,l}
M ρˆa
)
(6)
= (2π)n
∫
W
{j,k,l}
M (ξ)Wa(ξ)d
2nξ.
Here ρˆj,k,lM = ρˆ
tS=j
S ⊗ ρˆ
tR0=k
R0
⊗ ρˆtR1=lR1 describes the sepa-
rable state of the 3 modes obtained after each party has
measured its corresponding quadrature and obtained an
output j, k, l. Thus, the state of the system after the
measure can be described by a fully separable covariance
matrix γM ,
γM =

 γm 0 00 γm 0
0 0 γm

 . (7)
where each party has a pure one-mode Gaussian state
with covariance matrix
γm =
(
σ2 0
0 1/σ2
)
(8)
and displacement vector dTm = (−|x0|, 0). On the other
hand Wa is the Wigner function of the initial tripartite
entangled state ρˆa described by γ(a) and d.
Since Gaussian states are symmetric with respect to
their displacement vector, it is easy to see that a mapping
into classical trits such that all possible outputs {0, 1, 2}
occur with the same probability is not possible. There-
fore, the primitive discussed in the discrete case must be
modified when adapted to the CV scenario. The way we
find to overcome this asymmetry of the output’s prob-
abilities relies on joining the correlations from pairs of
quantum states. First we map the quantum correlations
involved in each single quantum state just to classical bits
by a “sign binning” (as in CV QKD [23]). That is, first we
keep only the results for which the three players obtain a
coincident output |xS | = |xR0 | = |xR1 | = x0 > 0, and as-
sociate the logical bit bn = 0(1), where n = {S,R0, R1},
to positive (negative) value of the coincident quadrature
x0(−x0). In every measurement the sender makes pub-
lic his outcome result |x0|, whatever the output is, but
not its sign in such a way that in principle all states are
going to be used in the protocol. Second, we construct
a primitive consisting of a random permutation of the
elements (i, j, k) ∈ {(0, 1, 1), (1, 0, 1), (1, 1, 0)}. Compul-
sory for the implementation of the primitive is that every
element of the primitive appears with equal probability
and any other combination of the outputs not regarded
by the primitive is exceedingly small compared to the
allowed permutations. In other words, we demand that
p ≡ P(0, 1, 1) = P(1, 0, 1) = P(1, 1, 0), and, denoting by
δ ≡ P(else), we require that the corresponding condi-
tional probabilities,
P˜(bS , bR0 , bR1) =
P(bS, bR0 , bR1)∑
i,j,k={0,1} P(j, k, l)
,
fulfill p˜→ 13 and δ˜ → 0.
If the above conditions are met, it is possible then by
invoking two consecutive times the previous generator
[i.e. using a pair of quantum states of the class Eq. (3)],
to map the bit values to trit-values (0,1,2) plus an ad-
ditional undesired element “u”. For instance, the play-
ers, after keeping only those bits obtained by coincident
quadrature outputs ±x0, use two consecutive bits m and
m+ 1 for the following association:
(1, 0)→ 0
(0, 1)→ 1
(1, 1)→ 2
(0, 0)→ u
Thus, by concatenating two invocations, one gener-
ates the permutations corresponding to the primitive
{(0, 1, 2), (0, 2, 1), (1, 0, 2), (1, 2, 0), (2, 0, 1), (2, 1, 0)} plus
a permutation of undesired elements (u, 2, 2), (2, u, 2),
(2, 2, u) which will be discarded during the protocol.
With all these tools at hand, optimal results for the de-
sired probabilities are achieved for a displacement vector
5of the form dT = −x03 (1, 0, 1, 0, 1, 0), and yield:
δ1 = P(1, 1, 1) = C(a, σ) exp
(
−4
3
x20
K1
)
,
δ2 = P(0, 0, 0) = C(a, σ) exp
(
−16
3
x20
K1
)
, (9)
δ3 = P(0, 0, 1) = P(0, 1, 0) = P(1, 0, 0)
= C(a, σ) × exp
[
−4x20
(
σ2 + 14
[
5a−√9a2 − 8])
K1K2
]
,
and
p = P(0, 1, 1) = P(1, 0, 1) = P(1, 1, 0)
= C(a, σ) exp
(
−8
3
x20
K2
)
,
(10)
with coefficients K1 = σ
2 + 12
[
3a−√9a2 − 8], K2 =
σ2 + 14
[
3a+
√
9a2 − 8], and prefactor
C(a, σ) =
[
det
(
γM + γ(a)
2
)]− 12
=
8
(a− c+ σ2) (b+ c+ 1
σ2
)√
(a+ 2c+ σ2)
(
b− 2c+ 1
σ2
) .
The probability distribution depends on the parameters
a, x0 and σ. In the case a ≫ 1, it can be seen that the
conditional probabilities satisfy the following:
p˜ =
1
3
− 4
9
k +O(k2); δ˜i → 0 (11)
with k = exp
[− 43 (x0σ )2]. In the limit of a perfect, zero-
uncertainty homodyne detection (σ → 0), p˜ converges
exactly to 1/3. In general, there exists a large region in
the parameters space for which p˜ → 13 and δ˜i → 0, as
depicted in Fig. 1.
However, there is a lower bound on the entanglement
content of the symmetric Gaussian states of Eq. (3) in or-
der to fulfill the above conditions. Only for a ≥ athresh ≡
5
√
2
6 ≈ 1.18, one has that p˜ > δ˜i, which is a necessary
condition to implement the primitive. This indicates
that not all pure three-mode symmetric full entangled
Gaussian states can be successfully employed to solve
detectable broadcast via our protocol. This entangle-
ment threshold is an a priori bound which does not de-
pend on the specific form of the employed resource states.
For any parametrization of the covariance matrix of ρˆa,
which is obtainable from γ(a) by local unitary squeez-
ing transformations (hence at fixed amount of tripartite
entanglement), the same condition discriminating useful
resource states is analytically recovered. We remark that
this bound becomes tight in the limit x0 →∞, meaning
that a ≥ athresh becomes necessary and sufficient for the
successful implementation of the primitive.
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FIG. 1: (Color online) Plot of the conditional probability p˜
as a function of the measurement outcome x0 and the shared
entanglement a, for pure symmetric tripartite Gaussian re-
source states. Detectable broadcast is ideally solvable in the
huge, unbounded region of x0 ≫ 0, a ≫ 1, where p˜ → 1/3.
The entanglement threshold a = athresh ≡ 5
√
2/6 is depicted
as well (wireframe surface). All of the quantities plotted are
dimensionless.
IV. DISTRIBUTION AND TEST
We move now to the distribution & test part of the
protocol which represents the first step in the execution
of the appropriate primitive and has only two possible
outputs: Global success or global failure. In the case of
failure, a player assumes that something went wrong dur-
ing the execution of the protocol and aborts any further
action. In the case of global success, each of the parties
ends up with a set {K} of classical data, and the protocol
proceeds classically, according to the steps explained in
Section II.
From now on we assume that the players share pair-
wise secure classical channels and secure (noiseless) quan-
tum channels. The secure distribution & test part uses
correlations to validate the fairness of the other par-
ties. Therefore, quantum states are sent through noise-
less quantum channels and measures are performed mas-
sively. In doing so, it is possible to detect manipulation
of the data on a statistical basis and abort the protocol if
necessary. In this Section we mostly focus on the issue of
security in the distribution and security test of the data.
This should permit the detection of any malicious ma-
nipulation of the data. The explicit effects of sabotage
actions will be reported in Section V. We postpone the
important issue of how well the protocol will succeed in
the case that the outputs of the measurements are not
perfectly correlated to Section VI. The reader not inter-
ested in the detailed description of the distribution & test
part can skip the rest of this section and jump to Section
V or VI instead.
The distribution & test part proceeds as follows:
(i-1) Without losing generality, let us assume that R1 pre-
pares a large number, M , of tripartite systems in state
ρˆa (i.e. with covariance matrix γ(a) and displacement d)
and sends one subsystem to S and another to R0.
6(i-2) R1 wants to check if the distribution of states is
faithfully achieved. To this aim she or he chooses ran-
domly a set of indices for player S, {KS}, and a dis-
joint set of indices for player R0, {KR0}, and sends these
two sets over secure classical channels to the correspond-
ing players. Player S sends his or her {KS} subsystems
to player R0. For each m ∈ {KS}, R0 measures the
two subsystems in his or her possession and R1 mea-
sures his subsystem. After communication of their re-
sults over secure classical channels, they agree on those
indices {K˜S} ⊆ KS for which |xR0 | = |xR1 | = x0. R1 and
R0 check now whether the correlations predicted by the
primitive occur: p˜ = P˜(011) = P˜(101) = P˜(110) = 13 ,
δ˜ = 0. If the test was successful, i.e. if the measure-
ment results were consistent with the assumption that
the states have been distributed correctly, the players
i ∈ {R0, R1} set the flag fi = 1, otherwise fi = 0. In an
analogous way, the test is performed for S.
(i-3) Players S, R0 and R1 send their flags to each other.
Every player who receives a flag “0”, sets his flag also
to “0”. Every player with flag “0” aborts the protocol.
Otherwise, the execution of the protocol proceeds. This
step terminates the distribution & test of the quantum
systems.
In the second phase of the protocol a selection of the
distributed systems is chosen to establish the bit se-
quences which will be used to implement the quantum
primitive. In this phase, again honest parties may abort
the protocol if malicious manipulations occur.
(ii-1) The players S, R0 and R1 agree upon a set of sys-
tems which have not been discarded during the distribu-
tion & test part.
(ii-2) Player S chooses (randomly) two disjoint sets of
subsystems labeled by indices LiS ⊂ M˜ . He or she sends
the set LiS to player i and demands player i to send via a
noiseless quantum channel his or her subsystems m ∈ LiS
to him or her. In each case, the (random) choice LiS
is secret to party j, i.e. player R1 has no information
whatsoever about the set LR0S . An analogous procedure
is adopted by R0 and R1.
(ii-3) After measuring their whole sequence of subsys-
tems, player i ∈ {S,R0, R1} announces publicly, the
set of indices {Mˆmi } ∈ Mˆi for which the output of the
quadrature measurement was |x0| The order in which
the players announce their measurement results can be
specified initially and based, e.g. on a rotation princi-
ple. (Notice that the announcement of |xi| = x0 during
the actual measurement phase would make possible an
effective traitor strategy, since he could manipulate com-
binations on a systematic basis).
(ii-4) Without loss of generality, let us explicitly describe
this step of protocol for player S. From the following sets
LR0S ∩MˆmR1 =: UR1S and LR1S ∩MˆmR0 =: UR0S let U˜RiS ⊆ URiS
for i ∈ {0, 1} be the index set for which the player S mea-
sured ±x0 twice. Analogously to the first phase of the
protocol, player S can test if the outputs of his mea-
sures agree with the correlations of a proper primitive
(p(00) = p(10) = p(01) = 1/3 and p(11) = 0) If the test
is successful, the player sets his flag fS = 1, otherwise
fS = 0. The same procedure is analogously performed
by R0 and R1. From this step on, the players deal exclu-
sively with the outputs of their measures, i.e. classical
data and secure classical channels.
(ii-5) S checks correlation on his outputs in the following
set Mˆ := MˆmS ∩ MˆmR0 ∩ MˆmR1 ⊆ MˆmS . If the test is suc-
cessful, S sets his flag fS = 1, otherwise fS = 0. R0 and
R1 do the equivalent step.
(ii-6): From a randomly chosen set V S ⊂ Mˆ player S
demands from R0 and R1 their measurement results. S
tests this control sample for the assumed primitive. If the
test is successful, S sets his flag fS = 1, otherwise fS = 0.
R0 (R1) perform this step with a set V
R0 ⊂ Mˆ\V S
(V R1 ⊂ Mˆ\(V S ∪ V R0)) respectively.
(ii-7) Every player with a flag 0 aborts the execution of
the protocol. Otherwise the players agree upon a set
W := Mˆ\(V S ∪ V R0 ∪ V R1) as the result of the invoca-
tion of the primitive, which consists in an even number
of elements. This step concludes the distribution part of
the protocol.
V. ERROR ESTIMATION
We examine here two possible sources of error, which
can occur during the implementation of the primitive
with Gaussian states. While the first source is inherent
to the system, the second is caused by an active adver-
sary intervention of a participating party. The inherent
error is caused by the occurrence of non consistent com-
binations on the invocation of the primitive, that is, the
occurrence of outputs (1, 1, 1), (0, 0, 0), (0, 0, 1), (0, 1, 0)
and (1, 0, 0) has to be considered. This error will propa-
gate along the protocol, so that the probability of finding
a combination which is not appropriate is bounded from
above from η = 1− (3p˜)2.
The second source of errors we want to discuss here
corresponds to the local actions that one of the players
could do in order to manipulate the measurement results
of other players. For instance, let us assume that the
player R0 has malicious intentions and wants to shift the
local component of the displacement vector of the dis-
tributed state using local transformations. Note that a
shift of the quadrature output x0, provides the same error
in the probability distribution of the outputs as a shift in
the corresponding displacement vector. In other words,
both types of manipulations produce the same change in
the probabilities as calculated in Eq.(6). Parameterizing
the shift in the displacement vector by the parameter K,
dT 7→ (d′)T = −x03 (1, 0, 1, 0,K, 0), it is interesting to see
how that affects the conditional probabilities p˜ and δ˜. If
probabilities were changed, player R0 could try to de-
termine [via subsequent communication with the other
players (step ii-3)], with certain probability, the occur-
rence of the outputs of the other players, thereby gaining
additional information. Notice also that S and R1 can-
not realize the local manipulation of R0 without classi-
7cal communication between them. This can be trivially
seen by realizing that the partial trace TrR0(ρˆa(γ, d
′)) =∫
W ′ξdxR0dpR0 =W
′
ξ(γS,R1 , dS,R1) = TrR0(ρˆa(γ, d)) with
γS,R1 =


a 0 c 0
0 b 0 −c
c 0 a 0
0 −c 0 b

 and dS,R1 =


x1
0
x1
0

 .
(12)
Thus the most plausible strategy for a traitor could con-
sist of the following: (i) Discrediting honest players by
manipulating the displacement vector in such a way that
non consistent combinations appear, (ii) hide successful
measurements to the honest players which result in com-
binations that might be disadvantageous. It is tedious
but straightforward to show that by making use of the
test steps (ii-4)–(ii-6) honest parties can detect the effects
of such manipulations.
VI. EFFICIENT REALISTIC
IMPLEMENTATION
The protocol, as discussed in the previous Sections,
constitutes a nice proof-of-principle of the fact that de-
tectable broadcast is solvable in the CV scenario using
multipartite Gaussian entanglement. However, it suffers
from its reliance on two main idealizations which render
the practical implementation of the primitive unrealistic,
or, better said, endowed with zero efficiency. Specifically,
we have requested that (i) a pure tripartite symmetric
Gaussian state is distributed as the entangled resource;
and (ii) when the three parties measure (via homodyne
detection) the position of their respective modes, their
measurement is taken to be ideal, that is not affected by
any uncertainty, and moreover all parties must obtain, up
to a sign, the same outcome x0. In reality, assumption (i)
is unjustified as inevitable imperfections and losses result
instead in the production of mixed, thermalized states;
on the other hand, the probability associated to (ii), and
hence the probability of achieving broadcast, is vanish-
ingly small [25]. It is interesting, in view of potential
practical implementations of our scheme, to study here
how its success is affected, and possibly guaranteed, by
relaxing the above two assumptions.
To deal with (i), let us recall that the tripartite en-
tangled Gaussian states of Eq. (3) can be produced in
principle by letting three independently squeezed beams
(one in momentum, and two in position) interfere at
a double beam splitter, or “tritter” [26], as proposed
by van Loock and Braunstein [18]. In practice, the
parametric nonlinear process employed to squeeze the
vacuum is affected by losses which result in the ac-
tual generation of squeezed thermal states in each single
mode. Before the tritter, one then has three independent
Gaussian modes with covariance matrices γin1 (s, n) =
diag{ns, n/s}, γin2 (s, n) = γin3 (s, n) = diag{n/s, ns}, re-
spectively, where s = exp(2r) (with |r| the squeezing
degree in each single mode) and n ≥ 1 is the noise pa-
rameter affecting each mode. The noise n is related to
the initial marginal purity µink of each single mode by
n = 1/µink [27], and corresponds to a mean number of
thermal photons given by n¯th = (n − 1)/2. For n = 1,
each mode is in the ideally pure squeezed vacuum state.
After the tritter operation, described by the symplectic
matrix [18, 26, 28]
T =


1√
3
0
√
2
3 0 0 0
0 1√
3
0
√
2
3 0 0
1√
3
0 − 1√
6
0 1√
2
0
0 1√
3
0 − 1√
6
0 1√
2
1√
3
0 − 1√
6
0 − 1√
2
0
0 1√
3
0 − 1√
6
0 − 1√
2


,
the output covariance matrix of the three modes is given
precisely by
γout = T · [γin1 (s, n)⊕ γin2 (s, n)⊕ γin3 (s, n)] · T T ≡ nγ(a) ,
(13)
where γ(a) is defined in Eq. (3) and we have made the
identification a = [(s2 + 2)/(3s)]. Eq. (13) describes
generally mixed, fully symmetric three-mode Gaussian
states, with global purity given by µ = n−3, thus reduc-
ing to the pure instance of Eq. (3) for n = µ = 1. Recall
that any additional losses due e.g. to an imperfect tritter
and/or to the distribution and transmission of the three
beams can be embedded into the initial single-mode noise
factor n, so that Eq. (13) provides a realistic description
of the states produced in experiments [19, 29]. We there-
fore consider this more general family of Gaussian states
as resources to implement the CV version of the prim-
itive. It may be interesting to recall that also for the
general family of states of Eq. (13) the genuine tripartite
entanglement is exactly computable [28] in terms of the
residual contangle [21], and as expected, it increases with
a and decreases with n.
Concerning the idealization (ii) discussed above, for an
efficient implementation we should first consider the real-
istic case of nonideal homodyne detections, which means
that the outcomes are affected by uncertainties quanti-
fied by the parameter σ, see Eq. (6). Furthermore, we
should let the parties measure within a finite range, which
means specifically that in each measurement run the ex-
pected values for the measurement outcomes of the re-
ceivers can be shifted of some quantity ∆ with respect to
the corresponding expectation value of the sender’s ho-
modyne detection. So, what we should ask for is that
the parties (one sender S and two receivers R0 and R1)
agree on those outcomes of their measurement results for
which |xˆS | = x0 > 0 and |xˆR0 | = |xˆR1 | = (x0 + ∆) > 0,
once the sender has announced his or her output results
x0 to the other two parties. Here, the actual results of
each measurement are assumed to distribute according to
a Gaussian function centered at x0 (for the sender) and
x0+∆ (for the receivers), respectively, with a variance σ.
8Now the associated events occur with a finite probabil-
ity. We wish to investigate for which range of the positive
shift ∆ ∈ [∆min, ∆max], being ∆max−∆min the range, the
conditional probability p˜ still approaches 1/3. The wider
such range, the higher the probability of success, or effi-
ciency, of the protocol; of course the regions in the space
of parameters such that the primitive can be efficiently
implemented will depend on the specific boundaries ∆min
and ∆max and not only on their difference. Notice that
in order to ensure that the sign of the quadratures does
not change when allowing a finite range of valid output
values (and therefore, correlations between classical bits
are properly extracted (see Sec. III)), we always demand
the shift ∆ to be positive. This condition can be further
relaxed allowing for a non-symmetric range of permitted
values around the broadcasted value x0. This extra con-
dition, which could be straightforwardly included in our
expressions if one aims at maximizing the efficiency of
our protocol, does not modify the analysis of the real-
istic implementation of the protocol we perform in this
Section. For the sake of clarity, we remark once again the
role of the parameter ∆: Allowing a nonzero shift ∆ in
the computation of the probability p˜, means considering
the realistic case in which the outcomes of the measure-
ments performed by each receiver can be not coincident
with each other, and not coincident even with the corre-
sponding broadcasted value of |x0|. In what follows we
show that the protocol can be run successfully provided
that the deviations |xR0 | − |xS | and |xR1 | − |xS | (in each
run) both lie in between a ∆min and a ∆max, which will
be determined.
To this aim, we can perform an analysis similar to the
one of Section III, but considering in full generality a
non-unit noise factor n, a non-zero uncertainty σ, and
a non-zero shift ∆. The calculations of the probabilities
follow straightforwardly along the lines of the special (un-
realistic) case previously discussed, and we finally obtain
p˜ =
{
3 + 3e
−
4(∆+x0)[∆(4σ2+7a−3R)+(4σ2+3a+R)x0]
3(4σ4+9aσ2−Rσ2+4)
+ e
4x0[4(a−R)∆+(4σ2+9a−5R)x0]
3(4σ4+9aσ2−Rσ2+4)
+ e
− 32(∆+x0)[∆(σ
2+a)+(σ2+R)x0]
3(4σ4+9aσ2−Rσ2+4)
}−1
, (14)
with R =
√
9a2 − 8. We find that in the parameter
space of a (regulating the entanglement), n (regulat-
ing the mixedness), x0 (regulating the measurement out-
come), σ (regulating the measurement uncertainty), and
∆ (regulating the measurement shift), there exists a sur-
face which acts as the boundary for the regime in which
our primitive can be faithfully implemented, yielding a
feasible, robust solution to the broadcast problem. This
surface is obtained by requiring that p˜ = 1/3−ǫ, with the
deficit ǫ chosen arbitrarily small. The result is plotted in
Fig. 2 for ǫ = 10−7 in the three-dimensional space of pa-
rameters x0/
√
n, ∆/
√
n, and a, for different values of σ.
We consider the primitive as efficiently implementable in
the whole region such that 1/3 − ǫ ≤ p˜ ≤ 1/3, which
spans the volume above the surface of Fig. 2. Notice
that for σ = 0, n = 1, and ∆max → ∆min → 0, such
a useful volume shrinks to a two-dimensional slice (with
a ≥ 5√2/6) which represents the parameter range in
which the “ideal” implementation described in Sec. III
is successful.
The figure offers several reading keys. Let us inves-
tigate independently how the possibility of solving de-
tectable broadcast via our protocol depends on the in-
dividual parameters. For simplicity, we will consider n
fixed and eventually discuss its role. We will also for
the moment keep the idealization of error-free homodyne
measurements (σ = 0), corresponding to Fig. 2(a): this
makes the subsequent discussion more tractable. How-
ever we will relax such an assumption in the end to show
that a realistic description of the homodyne measurement
does not significantly affect the performance and the ap-
plicability of the protocol. This validates the claims of
efficiency that we make in the following.
Let us henceforth start with the dependence of the
solution on a. Somehow surprisingly, there exist lower
and upper bounds on the tripartite entanglement such
that only for amin ≤ a ≤ amax the protocol achieves a
solution. The bounds naturally depend on x0 and ∆.
Specifically, we observe that amin diverges for ∆ = 0
and x0 → 0, meaning that no feasible solution can be
achieved in the low-∆, low-x0 regime; the reason being
that near x0 = 0 there is not possibility of associating
the classical bits ”0” and ”1” to positive/negative values
of the quadrature. The lower bound then goes down
reducing to the already devised threshold of athresh ≡
5
√
2/6 for ∆ close to zero and x0 ≫ 0, and eventually
converges to a = 1 (i.e. all entangled states are useful) for
any finite x0 ≫ 0 and ∆ → ∞. On the other hand, the
upper bound on a, which surprisingly rules out states
with too much entanglement, is obviously diverging at
∆ = 0 but becomes finite and relevant in the regime of
small x0 and large ∆, eventually reducing to 3/2 for any
finite x0 and ∆→∞.
Summarizing, the two extremal regimes corresponding
to ∆ = 0 on the one hand and ∆→∞ on the other hand,
both allow a solution of detectable broadcast via our pro-
tocol: The main difference is that in the former case one
needs states with an entanglement above amin = 5
√
2/6,
while in the latter case one needs states whose entan-
glement is below amax = 3/2. The regime of finite shift
∆ interpolates between these two limits. This means, in
terms of useful range, and hence of efficient implemen-
tations, that if one is able to produce entangled states
precisely with 5
√
2/6 < a < 3/2, the protocol is imple-
mentable with high efficiency for any shift ∆ ∈ [0,∞) in
the measurement outcomes. i.e. with an infinite range
of variability allowed for the acceptable data resulting
from homodyne detections performed by the receivers,
for a given outcome x0 of the sender. This information
is important in view of practical implementations, and
9FIG. 2: (Color online) Plots, in the space of x0/
√
n (quadrature measurement normalized to noise), ∆/
√
n (measurement shift
normalized to noise), and a (shared entanglement), of the boundary to the useful region for which p˜ = 1/3 − ǫ (ǫ = 10−7),
at different values of the homodyne detection uncertainty (a) σ = 0 (ideal error-free measurement), (b) σ = 1 (fixed error,
independent of the outcome), and (c) σ = |x0|/10 (proportional error, corresponding to a 90% efficiency in the detectors).
Detectable broadcast can be solved efficiently, by means of our protocol, for all values of the parameters which lie above the
depicted surface. See text for an extended discussion. All of the quantities plotted are dimensionless.
becomes especially valuable since the engineering of the
required entangled resources appears feasible: A squeez-
ing between 4.5 and 6 dB is required in each single mode,
which is currently achieved in optical experiments [30].
Fig. 2(a), alternatively, shows that for a fixed entan-
gled resource, a, there exist minimum thresholds both
for x0 and ∆ in order to achieve a solution to detectable
broadcast. While the useful range for x0 is always un-
bounded from above, we find that, interestingly, an up-
per bound ∆max exists for a > 3/2. Precisely, for a given
a > 3/2, with increasing x0 we observe that ∆min de-
creases and ∆max increases, i.e. the useful range spanned
by ∆ widens. Conversely, at a given x0, ∆max decreases
with increasing entanglement a, reducing the parameter
space in which a solution can be found. Consistently with
the previous discussion, we conclude again that in real-
istic conditions (∆ > 0) it is better to have a moderate
amount of shared entanglement to solve broadcast with
optimal chances.
Now, let us note that the noise parameter n simply
induces a rescaling of both x0 and ∆, in such a way that
with increasing n the surface bounding the useful range
of parameters shrinks, as it could be guessed (the noise
degrades the performance of the protocol). Still, with
typical noise factors characterizing experimental imple-
mentations, e.g. n = 2, the protocol appears very robust
and the solution is still achievable, for a given amount
of entanglement (say a . 3/2), provided that x0 and
∆ exceed
√
2 times their respective minimum thresholds
obtained for ideally pure resources (n = 1).
Finally, let us address the important issue of the un-
certainty affecting homodyne detections. Any realistic
measurement is characterized by a nonzero σ. We have
explicitly studied two situations, one in which the ab-
solute error is fixed, corresponding to a constant σ [see
Fig. 2(b)], and another in which the relative error is fixed,
corresponding to a σ proportional to the measurement
outcome x0 [see Fig. 2(c)]. The result is that, in both
cases, for not exceedingly high values of the error fac-
tor, the useful region is obviously reduced but, crucially,
the possibility of achieving detectable broadcast via our
protocol is still guaranteed in a broad range of values of
the parameters. Specifically, as somehow expected, the
error model in which σ is proportional to the measure-
ment outcome results in a more consistent modification
(shrinkage) of the useful surface, while almost nothing
happens in the case of fixed, small σ. In particular, up-
per bounds on x0 arise for a practical realization in the
presence of a proportional error, or in other words due
to a limited efficiency in the detection. A significant por-
tion of the parameter space anyway remains valid for a
workable implementation of the primitive. Our scheme is
thus robust also with respect to the imperfections in the
quadrature measurements. We draw the conclusion that
the protocol we designed is truly efficient and realistically
implementable in non-ideal conditions.
Fig. 3 explicitly depicts p˜, Eq. (14), for sensible re-
source values of a = 3/2 and n = 2, as a function of
x0 and ∆, and according to different values of σ like in
Fig. 2. We notice a huge (unbounded from above in the
ideal case σ = 0) region in which p˜ → 1/3, yielding an
efficient solution to detectable broadcast via our proto-
col. We have thus identified an optimal “work point” in
terms of the parameters describing the shared Gaussian
states, and we have defined the frontiers of application
of our scheme in the laboratory practice. In this way,
together with the explicit steps of the protocol presented
in the preceding sections, we obtain a clear-cut recipe
for a CV demonstration of detectable broadcast, which
we hope can be experimentally implemented in the near
future.
For the sake of completeness, let us mention that from
Eq. (14) we analytically find that p˜ converges exactly to
1/3 only in the following limiting cases (for a given finite
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FIG. 3: (Color online) Plots of the conditional probability p˜, Eq. (14), as a function of the measurement outcome x0 for the
sender and the shift ∆ of the measurement outcomes for the receivers, for realistically mixed Gaussian resource states with n = 2
and a = 3/2. The uncertainty in the homodyne detection is taken to be (a) σ = 0, (b) σ = 1, and (c) σ = |x0|/10. Detectable
broadcast is efficiently solvable in the wide plateau region where p˜→ 1/3. All of the quantities plotted are dimensionless.
n and σ = 0): (i) a → ∞ with ∆ < 3x0; (ii) x0 → ∞
with a ≥ 5√2/6; (iii) ∆→∞ with 1 < a ≤ 3/2.
VII. CONCLUDING REMARKS
In this paper we have proposed a protocol to solve de-
tectable broadcast with entangled continuous variables
using Gaussian states and Gaussian operations only. Our
algorithm relies on genuine multipartite entanglement
distributed among the three parties, which specifically
must share two copies of a three-mode fully symmetric
Gaussian state. Interestingly, we have found that never-
theless not all entangled symmetric Gaussian states can
be used to achieve a solution to detectable broadcast:
A minimum threshold exists on the required amount of
multipartite entanglement. We have moreover analyzed
in detail the security of the protocol.
In its ideal formulation, our protocol requires that the
parties share pure resource states, and that the outcomes
of homodyne detections are perfectly coincident and not
affected by any uncertainty; this however entails that our
protocol achieves a solution with vanishing probability.
To overcome such a practical limitation, we have eventu-
ally considered a more realistic situation in which the tri-
partite Gaussian resources are affected by thermal noise,
and, more importantly, the homodyne detections are re-
alistically imperfect, and there is a finite range of allowed
values for the measurement outcomes obtained by the
parties. We have thoroughly investigated the possibil-
ity to solve detectable broadcast via our protocol under
these relaxed conditions. As a result, we have demon-
strated that there exists a broad region in the space of
the relevant parameters (noise, entanglement, measure-
ment range, measurement uncertainty) in which the pro-
tocol admits an efficient solution. This region encom-
passes amounts of the required resources which appear
attainable with the current optical technology (with a
legitimate trade-off between squeezing and losses). We
can thus conclude that a feasible, robust implementa-
tion of our protocol to solve detectable broadcast with
entangled Gaussian states may be in reach. This would
represent another important demonstration of the use-
fulness of genuine multipartite continuous-variable en-
tanglement for communication tasks, coming to join the
recent achievement of a quantum teleportation network
[19].
This work was initially supported by the Deutsche
Forschungsgemeinschaft, the Spanish Grant No. FIS-
2005-01369, CONSOLIDER-INGENIO Grant No. 2006-
2010 CSD2006-0019 QOIT, Catalan Grant No. SGR-
00185, and EU IP Program SCALA.
[1] L. Lamport and M. J. Fischer, Byzantine generals and
transaction commit protocols., Technical Report 62, SRI
International (1982).
[2] L. Lamport, R. Shostak, and M. Pease, ACM Transac-
tions on Programming Languages and Systems 4, 382
(1982).
[3] M. Fitzi, N. Gisin, and U. Maurer, Phys. Rev. Lett. 87,
217901 (2001).
[4] M. Fitzi, D. Gottesman, M. Hirt, T. Holenstein, and A.
Smith, Proceedings of the twenty-first annual symposium
on Principles of distributed computing table of contents
Monterey, California, p. 118, (2002).
[5] S. Iblisdir and N. Gisin, Phys. Rev. A 70, 034306 (2004).
[6] C. H. Bennett and G. Brassard, in Proceedings of IEEE
International Conference on Computers, Systems, and
Signal Processing, Bangalore, India (IEEE, New York,
1984), p. 175.
[7] A. K. Ekert, Phys. Rev. Lett. 67, 661 (1991).
[8] C. H. Bennett, G. Brassard and N. D. Mermin, Phys.
Rev. Lett. 68, 557 (1992).
[9] M. Curty, M. Lewenstein, and N. Lu¨tkenhaus, Phys. Rev.
Lett. 92, 217903 (2004).
[10] A. Cabello, Phys. Rev. A 68, 012304 (2003).
[11] S. Gaertner, M. Bourennane, C. Kurtsiefer, A. Cabello,
and H. Weinfurter, Phys. Rev. Lett. 100, 070504 (2008).
[12] S. L. Braunstein and P. van Loock, Rev. Mod. Phys. 77,
11
513 (2005).
[13] N. Cerf, G. Leuchs, and E. S. Polzik eds., Quantum In-
formation with Continuous Variables of Atoms and Light
(Imperial College Press, London, 2007).
[14] F. Grosshans, A. Ac´ın, and N. J. Cerf, Continuous vari-
able quantum key distribution, in [13].
[15] F. Grosshans, G. van Assche, J. Wenger, R. Brouri,
N. J. Cerf, and P. Grangier, Nature 421, 238 (2003);
J. Lodewyck et al., Phys. Rev. A 76, 042305 (2007).
[16] M. B. Plenio and S. Virmani, Quant. Inf. Comp. 7, 1
(2007).
[17] G. Adesso and F. Illuminati, J. Phys. A 40, 7821 (2007).
[18] P. van Loock and S. L. Braunstein, Phys. Rev. Lett. 84,
3482 (2000).
[19] H. Yonezawa, T. Aoki, and A. Furusawa, Nature 431,
430 (2004).
[20] G. Adesso and F. Illuminati, Phys. Rev. Lett. 95, 150503
(2005); ibid. 99, 150501 (2007).
[21] G. Adesso and F. Illuminati, New J. Phys. 8, 15 (2006).
[22] Y. Lian, C. Xie, and K. Peng, New J. Phys. 9, 314 (2007).
[23] M. Navascue´s, J. Bae, J.I. Cirac, M. Lewenstein, A. San-
pera, and A. Ac´ın. Phys. Rev. Lett. 94 010502 (2005).
[24] G. Giedke, B. Kraus, M. Lewenstein, and J.I. Cirac,
Phys. Rev. A 64, 052303 (2001).
[25] C. Rodo´, O. Romero-Isart, K. Eckert, and A. Sanpera.
Open Syst. Inf. Dyn. 14, 69 (2007).
[26] S. L. Braunstein, Nature 394, 47 (1998).
[27] The purity µ is defined, for a quantum state ρˆ, as
µ = Trρˆ2. If ρˆ denotes a Gaussian state with covariance
matrix γ, then µ = 1/
√
det γ.
[28] G. Adesso, A. Serafini, and F. Illuminati, New J. Phys.
9, 60 (2007).
[29] T. Aoki, N. Takei, H. Yonezawa, K. Wakui, T. Hiraoka,
A. Furusawa, and P. van Loock, Phys. Rev. Lett. 91,
080404 (2003).
[30] S. Suzuki, H. Yonezawa, F. Kannari, M. Sasaki, and
A. Furusawa, Appl. Phys. Lett. 89, 061116 (2006);
Y. Takeno, M. Yukawa, H. Yonezawa, and A. Furu-
sawa, Opt. Express 15, 4321 (2007); H. Vahlbruch,
S. Chelkowski, K. Danzmann, and R. Schnabel,
New J. Phys. 9, 371 (2007).
